Corruption, Competition, and Contracts A Model of Vote Buying
| Author/creator | Vardy, Felix J. J. Author |
| Other author | Morgan, John Author |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Washington : International Monetary Fund |
| Description | 39 p. |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Complete |
| Summary | Annotation In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| ISBN | 9781451908077 |
| ISBN | 1451908075 (E-Book) Active Record |
| Stock number | 00013468 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |