/LC.GIF&client=easterncarolinaedu)
Free will as an open scientific problem / Mark Balaguer.
| Author/creator | Balaguer, Mark |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, |
| Description | viii, 202 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Complete |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from MIT Press Direct to Open Backfile HSS Monographs |
| Subjects |
| Contents | Introduction -- Formulating the problem of free will -- The old formulation of the problem of free will -- Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will -- The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will -- Some remarks on libertarianism -- Synopsis of the book -- Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant -- What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, assuming the OL view is correct -- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will -- Question, even if the OL view isn't correct -- The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question -- The coherence question -- The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting) -- Generalizing the argument -- Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question -- Where we stand and where we're going next -- An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question -- The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question -- The moral responsibility question -- Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy -- Preliminaries -- Torn decisions -- Indeterminacy -- Appropriate non-randomness -- The argument -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them -- The argument from token-token identity -- The argument from phenomenology -- Objections -- Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control -- Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting -- If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free -- Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions -- Where we stand -- Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)? -- An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism) -- An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism) -- Empirical arguments -- Arguments for universal determinism -- Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism -- Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism -- Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision -- Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism -- The argument from Tegmark's work -- The argument from Libet's work -- Arguments from psychology -- Where we stand. |
| General note | "A Bradford book." |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references (p. [185]-194) and index. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2009012426 |
| ISBN | 9780262013543 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | ✔ Available |