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020 a| 9780199698431;

020 a| 0199698430 (Trade Paper)c| USD 35.00 Retail Price (Publisher)9| Active Record;

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082 00 a| 171.52| 22;

100 1 a| Hurley, Paule| Author?| UNAUTHORIZED;

245 10 a| Beyond Consequentialismh| [electronic resource];

260 a| New York : b| Oxford University Press, Incorporated;

300 a| 288 p.c| 06.140 x 09.210 in.;

506 a| Available only to authorized users.;

520 8 a| Annotationb| Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challengeconsequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to dowhat morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he underminesconsequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinctconception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but does so, Hurley argues, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms.;

538 a| Mode of access: World Wide Web;

650 4 a| Ethics;

650 4 a| Pragmatism;

655 0 a| Electronic books.=| ^A491897;

856 40 z| Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Completeu| https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/eastcarolina/detail.action?docID=3054846;

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998 a| 4736331;

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Beyond Consequentialism

Author/creator	Hurley, Paul Author
Format	Electronic
Publication Info	New York : Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Description	288 p. 06.140 x 09.210 in.
Supplemental Content	Full text available from Ebook Central - Academic Complete
Subjects	Ethics Pragmatism

Summary	Annotation Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challengeconsequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to dowhat morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he underminesconsequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinctconception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but does so, Hurley argues, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms.
Access restriction	Available only to authorized users.
Technical details	Mode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/form	Electronic books.
ISBN	9780199698431
ISBN	0199698430 (Trade Paper) Active Record
Standard identifier#	9780199698431
Stock number	00020142

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Beyond Consequentialism

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