Tools

LEADER 03179cam 2200493 i 4500

001 on1348477953;

003 OCoLC;

005 20230725092933.0;

008 221023t20232023enk b 000 0 eng d;

020 a| 9781009285582;

020 a| 1009285580q| (pbk.);

020 z| 9781009285605q| ebook;

020 z| 9781009285629q| PDF ebook;

035 a| (Sirsi) o1348477953;

035 a| (OCoLC)1348477953;

050 4 a| JF529b| .L4 2023;

082 04 a| 324.42| 23;

100 1 a| Lefebvre, Perrin,e| author.?| UNAUTHORIZED;

245 10 a| Reform for sale :b| a common agency model with moral hazard frictions /c| Perrin Lefebvre and David Martimort.;

264 1 a| Cambridge :b| Cambridge University Press,c| 2023.;

264 4 ï| cu2023;

300 a| 78 pages ;c| 23 cm.;

336 a| textb| txt2| rdacontent;

337 a| unmediatedb| n2| rdamedia;

338 a| volumeb| nc2| rdacarrier;

490 0 a| Cambridge elements. Elements in law, economics and politics;

504 a| Includes bibliographical references (pages [74]-78).;

505 0 a| 1. Introduction -- 2. Literature review -- 3. The model -- 4. Unrestricted contracting -- 5. Nonnegative payments: preliminaries -- 6. Nonnegative payments and delegated agency: congruent interests -- 7. Nonnegative payments and delegated agency: conflicting interests -- 8. Coalitional behavior -- 9. Conclusion -- Appendix A. Proofs of main results -- Appendix B. Risk aversion -- References.;

520 a| Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals' preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals' preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus is linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size--back cover.;

650 0 a| Lobbying.=| ^A45595;

650 0 a| Pressure groups.=| ^A69305;

650 0 a| Policy sciences.=| ^A4525;

650 7 a| Lobbying.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst01001123;

650 7 a| Policy sciences.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst01068796;

650 7 a| Pressure groups.2| fast0| (OCoLC)fst01075954;

700 1 a| Martimort, David,e| author.=| ^A525976;

776 08 i| ebook version :z| 9781009285605;

949 a| Order on Demandw| ASISh| JOYNER219;

960 o| 1s| 22.00u| JPOSz| USD;

961 f| DMDm| 138099;

596 a| 1;

998 a| 6068617;

999 a| ORDER ON DEMANDw| ASISc| 1i| 6068617-1001l| JYBPDDAPm| JOYNERr| Ys| Yt| JYBPDDAPUu| 4/27/2023;

Reform for sale : a common agency model with moral hazard frictions / Perrin Lefebvre and David Martimort.

Author/creator	Lefebvre, Perrin author.
Other author	Martimort, David, author.
Format	Book
Publication	Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2023.
Copyright Date	cu2023
Description	78 pages ; 23 cm.
Subjects	Lobbying. Pressure groups. Policy sciences.

Series	Cambridge elements. Elements in law, economics and politics
Contents	1. Introduction -- 2. Literature review -- 3. The model -- 4. Unrestricted contracting -- 5. Nonnegative payments: preliminaries -- 6. Nonnegative payments and delegated agency: congruent interests -- 7. Nonnegative payments and delegated agency: conflicting interests -- 8. Coalitional behavior -- 9. Conclusion -- Appendix A. Proofs of main results -- Appendix B. Risk aversion -- References.
Abstract	Lobbying competition is viewed as a delegated common agency game under moral hazard. Several interest groups try to influence a policy-maker who exerts effort to increase the probability that a reform be implemented. With no restriction on the space of contribution schedules, all equilibria perfectly reflect the principals' preferences over alternatives. As a result, lobbying competition reaches efficiency. Unfortunately, such equilibria require that the policy-maker pays an interest group when the latter is hurt by the reform. When payments remain non-negative, inducing effort requires leaving a moral hazard rent to the decision maker. Contributions schedules no longer reflect the principals' preferences, and the unique equilibrium is inefficient. Free-riding across congruent groups arises and the set of groups active at equilibrium is endogenously derived. Allocative efficiency and redistribution of the aggregate surplus is linked altogether and both depend on the set of active principals, as well as on the group size--back cover.
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references (pages [74]-78).
Issued in other form	ebook version : 9781009285605
ISBN	9781009285582
ISBN	1009285580 (pbk.)
ISBN	ebook
ISBN	PDF ebook

Availability

Library	Location	Call Number	Status	Item Actions
Joyner	Order on Demand Title	Order On Demand	✔ Available	Click to order this title

Reform for sale : a common agency model with moral hazard frictions / Perrin Lefebvre and David Martimort.

Click here for more information about this title

Availability