Bayesian persuasion / Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow.
| Author/creator | Kamenica, Emir |
| Other author | Gentzkow, Matthew. |
| Other author | National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| Format | Electronic |
| Publication Info | Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, |
| Supplemental Content | Full text available from NBER Working Papers |
| Series | NBER working paper series ; working paper 15540 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 15540. UNAUTHORIZED |
| Summary | "When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| General note | Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/1/2009. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Other forms | Also available in print. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2009656090 |
Availability
| Library | Location | Call Number | Status | Item Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic Resources | Access Content Online | ✔ Available |