Tools

LEADER 03206cam 22004457a 4500

001 ssj0001360539;

003 WaSeSS;

005 20240612185429.0;

006 m d ;

007 cr n ;

008 050110s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng d;

010 a| 2005615273;

035 a| (WaSeSS)ssj0001360539;

040 a| DLCc| DLCd| DLCd| WaSeSS;

049 a| EREEa| NEHH;

050 00 a| HB1;

100 1 a| Auerbach, Alan J.=| ^A207559;

245 10 a| Budget windows, sunsets, and fiscal controlh| [electronic resource] /c| Alan J. Auerbach.;

260 a| Cambridge, MA :b| National Bureau of Economic Research,;

490 1 a| NBER working paper series ;v| working paper 10694;

500 a| Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/10/2005.;

504 a| Includes bibliographical references.;

506 a| Available only to authorized users.;

520 3 a| "Governments around the world have struggled to find the right method of controlling public spending and budget deficits. In recent years, the United States has evaluated policy changes using a ten-year budget window. The use of a multi-year window is intended to capture the future effects of policies, the notion being that a budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window's endpoint. But a budget window that is too long includes future years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and gives credit to fiscal burdens shifted to those whom the budget rules are supposed to protect. This suggests that there may be an "optimal" budget window, and seeking to understand its properties is one of this paper''s main objectives. Another objective is to understand a phenomenon that has grown in importance in U.S. legislation the "sunset." This paper argues that, with an appropriately designed budget window, the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions will evaporate, so that temporary provisions can be taken at face value. The analysis also has implications for how to account for long-term term budget commitments"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.;

530 a| Also available in print.;

538 a| Mode of access: World Wide Web;

650 0 a| Budget deficits.=| ^A206647;

650 0 a| Sunset reviews of government programs.=| ^A568425;

655 0 a| Electronic books.=| ^A491897;

710 2 a| National Bureau of Economic Research.=| ^A186;

830 0 a| Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;v| working paper no. 10694.?| UNAUTHORIZED;

856 40 z| Full text available from NBER Working Papersu| https://go.openathens.net/redirector/ecu.edu?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.3386%2Fw10694;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| JOYNER188;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| HSL77;

949 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISh| JMUSIC60;

596 a| 1 3 4;

998 a| 6165311;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 6165311-1001l| JNETm| JOYNERr| Ys| Yt| JNESSBKu| 7/15/2023x| EBOOKz| JERESOURCE;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 6165311-2001l| HSLELECm| HSLr| Ys| Yt| HEBKu| 7/15/2023x| EBOOKz| HERESOURCE;

999 a| CLICK ON WEB ADDRESSw| ASISc| 1i| 6165311-3001l| MNETm| JMUSICr| Ys| Yt| MNESSBKu| 7/15/2023x| EBOOKz| JERESOURCE;

Budget windows, sunsets, and fiscal control / Alan J. Auerbach.

Author/creator	Auerbach, Alan J.
Other author	National Bureau of Economic Research.
Format	Electronic
Publication Info	Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research,
Supplemental Content	Full text available from NBER Working Papers
Subjects	Budget deficits. Sunset reviews of government programs.

Series	NBER working paper series ; working paper 10694 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 10694. UNAUTHORIZED
Summary	"Governments around the world have struggled to find the right method of controlling public spending and budget deficits. In recent years, the United States has evaluated policy changes using a ten-year budget window. The use of a multi-year window is intended to capture the future effects of policies, the notion being that a budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window's endpoint. But a budget window that is too long includes future years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and gives credit to fiscal burdens shifted to those whom the budget rules are supposed to protect. This suggests that there may be an "optimal" budget window, and seeking to understand its properties is one of this paper''s main objectives. Another objective is to understand a phenomenon that has grown in importance in U.S. legislation the "sunset." This paper argues that, with an appropriately designed budget window, the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions will evaporate, so that temporary provisions can be taken at face value. The analysis also has implications for how to account for long-term term budget commitments"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
General note	Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/10/2005.
Bibliography note	Includes bibliographical references.
Access restriction	Available only to authorized users.
Other forms	Also available in print.
Technical details	Mode of access: World Wide Web
Genre/form	Electronic books.
LCCN	2005615273

Availability

Library	Location	Call Number	Status	Item Actions
	Electronic Resources	Access Content Online	✔ Available

Budget windows, sunsets, and fiscal control / Alan J. Auerbach.

Click here for more information about this title

Availability